Abstract: This paper presents disaggregated estimates of nominal and effective rates of tariff protection for Sweden 1885-1914. In a methodological part of the article I argue that the proper way to measure tariff protection is an output weighted average of tariff rates for a representative sample of commodities. In the empirical part of the paper, I show that Swedish tariff protection increased substantially in the period even though tariff income as a proportion of total imports decreased slightly. This seeming contradiction is explained by the restructuring of Swedish imports that took place in the period under review; the share in imports of highly protected consumer goods declined while the share of capital goods with lower protection rates and duty free raw materials and input goods increased. The result stands in contradiction to some recent views expressed in the international literature.
Introduction
After a period of free trade reforms that commenced in the 1850's Swedish trade policy made a protectionist turnaround in the late 1880's and early 1890's. In the 'free trade era' trade policy had been guided by the idea that food products, raw materials but also machines and other means of production should be exempted from custom duties. On other manufacturing products tariffs were lowered, although they were still quite high for certain products.
The principles that had guided trade policy in the preceding decades were overruled in 1888-1892. Free trade was still adhered to for most raw materials, but agrarian tariffs were reinstalled in 1888 and at the same time tariffs were also reintroduced for certain iron products. In most cases, however, manufacturing tariffs were bound by existing international trade treaties until 1892. Thereafter Swedish authorities were free to raise tariffs on manufactures as well. Machines and other means of productions were now given tariff protection while existing custom duties were raised on most other goods. The remaining cracks in the tariff wall were tightened in 1895, when the Swedish-Norwegian interstate law was abolished, thus ending the possibility of transit trade via Norway. The tariff scale was revised on several occasions. These revisions usually implied higher tariffs.
The main exceptions were the temporary lowering of agricultural tariffs in 1892-95 and the repeal in 1896 of the pig iron tariff that had been reintroduced in 1892.
The guiding principle of the Swedish tariff scale from the 1890s onwards was the 'solidaristic tariff system', inspired by the German tariff system under Bismarck. The idea was that tariff protection should be given to all sections of 'national labour' that needed it in order to compete with imports, but no industry was to be protected at the expense of other industries. Hence if tariffs were raised on inputs for some producers they were compensated by higher tariffs on their own products. In most cases, this led to higher tariffs upstream in the production chain. Typically, consumer goods were more protected than capital goods, which had higher protection than inputs. Raw materials were generally free of duties.
If the needs of special interests conflicted with what was perceived as the general interest the latter took precedence. 1 This is illustrated by the case of the pig iron tariff, introduced in 1892. It was repealed in 1896 since it proved impossible to stimulate home production of coke-based pig iron without raising the tariff to such a high level that it would unduly penalize other producers. Furthermore, Swedish charcoal pig iron producers were not threatened by imports because they competed in another market. They even exported a substantial portion of their output. 2 Heavy steel products such as rails and heavy beams were also duty-free, while lighter steel products were given substantial tariff protection. 3 4 The same arguments that led to the repeal of the pig iron tariff also kept tariffs on chemical products comparatively low or in many instances non-existent 5 .
For contemporaries, tariff policy was the most contentious industrial policy issue. 6 In 1919, a public investigation committee was appointed to evaluate its effects. The committee produced a public report in two volumes 7 and several studies on individual industries. One of the leading members of the committee was the doyen of Swedish economic history, Eli Heckscher. He was very critical of the protectionist system and his opinion clearly influenced the views expressed in the public report. According to Heckscher, the main effects of tariffs were that they stimulated the employment of factors of production in the protected home market industries to the detriment of their more useful employment in the export industries. Three decades later he reiterated his critical opinions, but now he did not think that tariffs were of any great importance:
"…it is probably justified to say that in peacetime protection was a somewhat retarding factor in the general growth of the Swedish economy because it imposed burdens on 1 1890 -1913 . Stockholm: SOU 1922 :52, 1922 . 3 Nilsson, Carl-Axel, Järn och stål i svensk ekonomi: 1885 -1912 . En marknadsstudie. Lund: Gleerup, 1972 In this important respect the Swedish tariff scale differed from the German, that otherwise inspired Swedish tariff makers. In Germany the heavier steel products received the highest protection at the expense of lighter products. See: Webb, Steven B., Tariff protection for the iron industry, cotton textiles and agriculture in Germany, . Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 1977:3-4 5 Mongomery, Arthur, Svensk tullpolitik 1816 -191, Stockholm, 1921 . 6 Kilander, Den nya staten och den gamla. The principal work on the formation of Swedish protectionism is Mongomery, Svensk tullpolitik. See also Gårestad, Peter, Industrialisering och beskattning i Sverige 1861 -1914 Despite exceptionally good source material, due not the least to publications of the above mentioned public investigation committee, we have less data about Swedish tariff rates than is the case for many other countries. 10 The purpose of this article is to remedy this lack of knowledge.
The measurement of tariff protection
Custom duties can be levied in two separate ways, either as a certain percentage of import values, ad valorem tariffs, or as a given sum of money per unit, specific tariffs. Consequently the ad valorem equivalent of a specific tariff depends on the price per unit. In Sweden, as in most countries on the European continent at the time, tariffs were predominantly specific.
The ad valorem tariff rate is a measure of nominal protection. In order to determine how domestic producers were affected by tariffs we also need to take into account that they had to buy inputs, whose prices were affected by tariffs. The degree of nominal tariff protection is often computed as total custom revenue divided by the value of imports. This measure is often used in international comparisons 11 probably because it is easy to compute, but it is nevertheless essentially flawed. It typically underestimates the degree of protection. If demand is price elastic the share of highly protected goods within total imports will shrink, which is after all the purpose of a protectionist tariff policy. In the extreme case where tariffs are prohibitive, deterring all imports, the average nominal tariff rate according to this measure will be zero. In order to compute a measure of nominal tariff protection it seems better to gauge the rate of protection for individual goods and industries and then combine them into a weighted average. This procedure raises the usual index number problem concerning the use of appropriate weighting schemes. Federico and Tena 12 discuss various weighting procedures. i) No weighting; the computed average tariff rate would than be equal to a simple average of the tariff rates on the commodities (i = 1…n) included in the index.
(1) UNT= ∑ ti/n ; where ti is the nominal ad valorem tariff rate on the ith good and n is the number of goods in the sample.
ii) Particular commodities are weighted in accordance with their share of the total import value. If all imported goods are included, this measure equals the measure total custom revenue divided by total import value.
(2) NT = ∑ r i t i ; where r i is the share of total imports for the ith good. where c i is the share of the ith good in domestic consumption of tradable goods.
Among these alternatives, we can exclude UNT, since it would give equal weight to every commodity irrespective of its importance. However Liepmann 13 and Loveday 14 , the architect behind the 1927 League of Nations study 15 , argued that an unweighted average will be reasonably accurate for international comparisons if the sample of commodities on which the average is calculated is sufficiently large and well-balanced. NT is easy to compute if we are prepared to accept the unit values of imported goods in the foreign trade statistics. However, in the majority of cases these are unreliable. 16 : Morgenstern revisited. 1991: vol. 28:3, 259-273. For the majority of the goods, however, the same unit price was kept for long periods, if not for the entire period from the early 1890s to WWI. Therefore we generally cannot use unit prices from the trade statistics.
Explorations in Economic History
nominal tariff rate. This is not necessarily so, however. In Sweden, the large export industries were generally unprotected. They would influence the average protection rate considerably less in NTWc than in NTWz. Arguing in a similar vein, oats, which was dutyfree, had a larger share in agricultural output than in domestic consumption. In addition, fiscal tariffs on non-competing agricultural goods, which were typically quite high, do not influence NTWz. If our purpose is to analyse the effects of tariffs on economic development it is hardly a drawback that the average tariff rate is computed based on an economic structure that it has contributed to shape. Besides, it is not possible to know what the economic structure would have been like in a hypothetical world of free trade, unless we are willing to make truly heroic counterfactual assumptions.
In order to calculate an average nominal tariff rate I use a two-stage procedure. In the first stage commodities are allocated to the various industries and nominal tariff rates for the individual industries are calculated. In the second stage, these sectoral tariff rates are used to calculate the average nominal tariff rate for the manufacturing and mining industry and the agricultural sector respectively. The shoe industry also provides an interesting case of how technical development quickly made existing tariffs excessive. In 1897/98 two categories of shoes were defined; shoes made of materials other than leather or un-dyed leather, which received a specific duty of 2 kr per kg and other more 'luxurious' shoes with 6 kr per kg in duty. After a few years, the majority of the shoes that were produced and sold had become 'luxurious'. 19 In 1913 approximately 75 percent of the shoes belonged to this category. In calculating the average tariff rate for the shoe industry I have used a simple average for these two categories of shoes, which yields an average nominal tariff rate of 34 percent in 1914. This figure is obviously too low. On the other hand, my weighting scheme probably over 18 SOU 1924:38, p estimates the tariff protection for the shoe industry in the 1890s, which points to another critical aspect of the calculation procedure, namely the implicit assumption that the weights of the various goods stayed unchanged. In most cases, however, the calculation of industry specific tariff rates are based on quite a large number of goods and the spread in tariff rates between the goods within an industry is not too wide, so intra industry weight shifting should not be a big source of error for my estimates.
Of more concern is probably how well the price indices reflect the development of import prices in each industry. 20 Where appropriate import price indices are lacking I have used Ljungbergs price indices for Swedish industrial sectors 21 under the somewhat unjustified assumption that the development of Swedish prices in these sectors mirrored world market prices. It should be borne in mind; however, that what is important in our formula is not the level but the general direction of change in import prices. Within reasonable margins of error, erroneous import prices should not decisively affect the time series of tariff rates presented in appendix 1.
Discussion of the results
A broad overview of the results of my calculations is shown in graph 1. The conventional measure of the rate of production, custom duties divided by total import value, does not increase at all as a result of the protectionist turnaround in trade policy. The trend is even pointing slightly downwards. This result is actually what can be expected from the changing goods composition of Swedish imports in the period under review. Table 1 shows that the composition of imports into Sweden changed significantly. The share of highly protected consumer goods and processed food fell whilst capital and input goods, which had lower tariff rates or were exempted from import duties, increased their share as did duty-free raw materials for the production of consumer goods. Sweden went through a period of intensified industrialization and import substitution in the 1890s. Import penetration fell in the heavily protected consumer goods industries. At the same time raw materials and inputs such as coal, cotton, pig iron and other bulky iron and steel products increased their share of imports. Most of these goods were not produced at all in Sweden and were generally free of duties. The growing share of duty free imports and of goods with relatively low tariff rates more than compensated for heightened tariffs on other imports, resulting in a low tariff rate when measured by the quotient total custom revenue divided by total import value as displayed in graph 1. The other lines in the graph give a more accurate view of the effects of the new tariff policy. They show the weighted average of nominal tariff rates in the manufacturing and mining industry 22 and in agriculture, where the weights are the shares of gross output in 1913. 23 (Graph 1 about here) (Table 1 about here)
The nominal tariff rate for dutiable manufactured goods, excluding food products, increased from 5-10 percent to about 20 percent as a result of the new tariff policy, at which level it stayed for the rest of the period, since import prices on industrial products were quite stable.
If we include processed food in the manufacturing industry the nominal tariff rate for dutiable products were more volatile; it increased to 30-35 percent in the late 1890s, after which it fell to about 25 percent in the first decade of the twentieth century. This decline in the nominal tariff rate on processed food was caused by rising prices. As can be seen from graph 1 the tariff rate on processed food mirrored the agricultural tariff rate from the late 1890s, which fell because of rising agricultural prices.
The measures of protection displayed in graph 1 are weighted averages of many diverse goods and industries and much useful information is hidden in the aggregates. To evaluate Swedish protectionism it is useful to distinguish between agricultural goods, raw materials 24 , capital goods 25 processed food 26 and other consumer goods 27 , since they were treated differently by the new tariff policy. 22 Power stations, gas-works and waterworks are excluded from the estimate. 23 The tariff rate for agriculture is a simple average of the tariff rates for animal food products (meat and pork) and grain. 24 Iron ore mines, Other metal mines, Stone quarrying and stone works, Sawmills. 
Agricultural goods
The introduction of tariffs on grain in 1888 marked the decisive break with the free trade era. A specific tariff of 2.5 kr per 100 kg was levied on wheat, rye and barley, corresponding to a rate of protection of approximately 25 percent for rye and barley and 20 percent for wheat. Oats was protected by a tariff of 1 kr per 100 kg, corresponding to a nominal protection of about 10 percent. Because of falling prices the tariffs on wheat, rye and barley were lowered in 1892 to 1.25 kr per 100 kg, while the tariff on oats was abolished. The lower tariffs had hardly been introduced before grain prices increased again.
In order to improve the competitiveness of Swedish producers the tariffs on wheat, rye and barley were augmented to 3.7 kr per 100 kg in 1896, at which level they stayed for the rest of our period. This translated into an ad valorem tariff rate for wheat that fluctuated between 25 and 30 percent in the period 1896-1913. The average tariff rate on grain was roughly five percentage units lower since the most important cereal in Swedish agriculture, oats 28 , was duty free from 1892 onwards.
The year 1888 also marked the introduction of tariffs on animal food products such as pork and meat. Pork was given a protection of 20 kr per 100 kg while the specific tariff on beef was 7 kr per 100 kg. The ad valorem equivalent of these specific tariffs was approximately 25 percent in 1888-90 and about 20 percent towards the end of our period.
Tariffs imposed on imports of non-competing agricultural products were of another character. 29 Custom duties had always been levied on these products; the motivation was exclusively fiscal. Among the non-competing agricultural products coffee was the most important followed by tobacco. The specific tariff on coffee beans was lowered in 1889 from 0,26 kr to 0,12 kr per kg; otherwise, specific tariffs on non-competing agricultural products stayed more or less the same. Lowered fiscal tariffs were in effect part of the protectionist programme. In order to compensate consumers for the rise in cost of living following the imposition of agricultural tariffs the protectionists advocated the reduction of 27 Glass works, Potteries and earthenware works, Printing and allied industries, Textile industry, Clothing and garment industry, Boot-and shoe industry, Tanneries, Rubber goods industry, Soap and detergent industry, Match industry. 28 The share of oats in the total value of production of grain was 47 percent in 1913. Lindahl, Dahlgren, Kock, National Income, Part two, table 65, p. 29. 29 I have calculated the tariff rate on non-competing agricultural product as a weighted average of the following products: oranges, lemons, coffee beans, tobacco, and wine, using the import share of the respective commodities in 1913 as weights. fiscal tariffs. 30 Because of the tariff reduction on coffee beans and price increases, fiscal tariffs sank from about 30-40 percent in 1885-88 to roughly 15 percent in the early 1890s, after which the tariff rate increased again when prices declined (table 2) (Table 2 about here)
Raw materials and capital goods
Most of the goods produced by the raw material and capital goods industries were duty free before 1888-92. The imposition of tariffs on capital goods was a clear violation of earlier free trade principles. When analysing tariff protection in the capital goods sector it is useful to make a distinction between the export industries and industries that were primarily oriented towards the home market. If we concentrate on the most important branches of industry we include the iron ore mines, saw mills, the pulp industry and the paper industry in the first category. In the latter category we have the iron-and steel industry 32 , and iron-, steel and metal goods manufacturers. The machine and engineering industry also produced primarily for the home market, although Sweden succeeded in starting up export of some engineering products around the turn of the century. 33 Nevertheless Sweden still had large import dependence on these products 34 , so it seems reasonable to include the engineering and machine industry in the home market industries.
In general, export industries were unprotected while home market industries were protected. There is only one exception to this rule, the paper industry, which was heavily protected already in the free trade era. This protection was somewhat extended in the late 1880s, when specific tariffs were raised by about 10 percent. Since paper prices fell more or less continuously between 1885 and 1914, the average nominal tariff rate of the paper 30 Montgomery, Svensk tullpolitik, p. 143. 31 Gårestad, Industrialisering och beskattning, This is not clear-cut since Sweden also had a substantial export of steel products, however, production for the home market was more important. 33 industry increased from about 25 percent to approximately 45 percent in 1914. The protection of the paper industry was partially inconsequential, however, since Swedish firms specialised to an increasing extent and with great success in coarse paper (for newspapers, wrapping paper etc.). In the years preceding WWI, the largest Swedish plants were technically up to date with the best US plants and Sweden was a major exporter of coarse paper. 35 Prices were accordingly set in the world market, so the tariffs were not utilized for these products. 36 The only influence tariffs may have had was to prevent dumping. In the production of finer quality paper, Swedish firms were not competitive and the substantial protection on these types of goods was at least halfway utilized. 37 (Table 3 about here) For the home market oriented capital goods industries the new tariff policy made a big difference. A symbolic cornerstone of the new tariff policy was the imposition of tariffs on machines and instruments of various sorts. These were mostly ad valorem tariffs at 15 percent that had been imposed in 1888 and 1892. The average tariffs on the output of the iron and steelworks were raised from nothing to 20-25 percent in the early 1890s. As a consequence of the repeal of the pig iron tariff in 1896 the average tariff on iron and steel products was lowered to about 15 percent (Appendix1). On average, the tariff protection for the home market oriented capital goods industries increased from about 5 percent in 1885 to roughly 15 percent in the 1890s. If we look at capital goods industries producing primarily for the home market, i.e. capital goods excluding the pulp and paper industry, the tariff protection rose from roughly 2 percent in 1885 to 13 percent in the 1890's as a consequence of the new tariff policy (table 3).
Processed food and other consumer goods
Among consumer goods industries we may distinguish between different categories. Some of the commodities were highly protected even before the turnaround in commercial policy, due to fiscal reasons. The relatively high tariffs imposed on the miscellaneous food industry (roast coffee was an important item in this industry), the tobacco industry and the chocolate and sweet industry as well as the sugar industry (sugar factories and sugar 35 Outside the food industry, consumer goods industries that were heavily protected before the changeover in tariff policy had their tariffs increased only slightly in the 1890s.
Among these we find the pottery industry, the glass industry and to a certain extent the textile industry. The tariffs on the products of the pottery industry were roughly unchanged, while protection in the glass industry increased by about 25 percent. According to my calculation, their tariff rate varied between 20 and 25 percent from the middle of the 1890s onwards. On textile products specific tariffs increased by about 15 percent in the early 1890s, which translated into an ad valorem tariff rate that fluctuated around 20 percent, depending on import prices.
In another group we find consumer goods industries that received sharply higher protection in the 1890s. In this category we include the tanneries, the boot and shoe factories and the rubber goods industry. The tariffs of the tanneries and the boot and shoe industry were only slightly increased in the early 1890s. They proved insufficient to make the Swedish producers competitive with imports. In order to remedy this situation their tariffs were roughly doubled in the late 1890s.
Effective protection
In evaluating a tariff system, it is also necessary to take into account that firms and industries buy inputs form other industries, whose prices are marked up by tariffs. The rate of effective protection of an industry is computed by the following formula:
where g j is the rate of effective protection in industry j, and a ij is the share of costs for inputs from industry i in the output of industry j. 38
The effective protection rate is calculated on the following strong assumptions: that the country is "small" in the world market, i.e. it faces an infinitely elastic supply curve for its imports and an infinitely elastic demand curve for its exports; that all produced inputs are traded and that technical input coefficients are fixed, that is they are the same irrespective of trade political regime. It shows the percentage degree of change in value added resulting from a protectionist trade system compared to free trade, i.e. an effective tariff rate of 20 percent signifies that the value added produced by an industry is 20 percent larger than would have been the case under free trade. The purpose of calculating effective tariff rates is to show how resource allocation is affected by tariffs, the idea being that factors of production are attracted to an industry whose value added increases relative to other industries. Equation (6) shows that the effective tariff rate in an industry depends on its own tariff rate, the weighted average of input tariffs and the share of value added. If the own rate of tariff is larger/smaller than input tariffs the effective rate of protection is positive/negative. The difference between nominal and effective tariff rates becomes larger the smaller is the share of value added. It is also evident from equation (6) why a protectionist tariff system, such as the Swedish in the late nineteenth century, imposes low or non-existent tariffs on raw materials, somewhat higher tariffs on produced inputs and the highest tariffs at the further end of the production chain. This escalation in tariff rates is typical for a protectionist trade policy and follows from an endeavor to equalize effective tariffs between industries. Accordingly, the highest tariff rates are to be found in the food processing and consumer goods industries.
( The general picture of the protective structure that emerges from nominal tariff rates is not changed by the calculation of effective tariffs. In other words, the industries that had the highest nominal tariff rates also had the highest effective tariff rates. Spearmans rank-order correlation coefficient between nominal and effective tariff rates is 0.86 in 1913.
Effective tariffs did not equalize the rate of protection between industries. The spread in effective tariff rates were greater than for nominal tariff rates; the coefficient of variation for effective tariffs was 1.31 for effective tariffs and 0.89 for nominal tariffs. The tariff system was apparently not constructed to equalize effective protection but to ensure the existence of firms producing for the domestic market. In many cases, a high rate of effective tariffs was necessary for the viability of an industry, in others high effective tariffs probably made possible profit rates above the average. It should also be kept in mind that the effective tariff rates are calculated on the assumption that all tariffs were fully utilized, which was not the case. The input-output coefficients are constructed from cost data for individual industries and will be published in a forthcoming work of mine. 40 Negative effective protection can also be seen in the shipbuilding industry. In this and other unprotected industries the firms were reimbursed for the tariffs they paid on imported inputs, but this could of course not compensate for price increases, as a result of tariffs, on domestically produced inputs. 41 League of Nations, Tariff level indices. 42 Liepmann, Tariff levels and the economic unity of Europe.
these, as reported in Bairoch 43 , shows much higher protection than the League of Nations study. 44 Compared to some countries that adhered to the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy in the twentieth century 45 and to contemporary high protectionist countries in eastern and southern Europe, or for that matter the USA, Swedish tariffs were moderate.
However, they were high enough to have substantial impact on the volume of imports.
From 1890 to the first decade of the twentieth century, the import share of the home market for consumer goods declined from roughly 50 percent to about 25 percent. In many cases, imports were virtually shut out from the home market. In the shoe industry, for example, the import penetration was over 50 percent in 1890, if we exclude handicraft production, whilst it had virtually disappeared after the turn of the century. In the textile industry the import penetration ratio sank from about 50 percent in the early 1890s to approximately 20 percent in 1913 and in the clothing and garment industry the decline in import share was even more pronounced. Domestic producers had a large share of the market for processed food already in the early 1890s; by 1913, the import penetration ratio had decreased by more than fifty percent compared to the early 1890s. In the glass industry, which was always highly protected, the import share of the domestic market remained more or less the same in the period under review. In the capital goods sector, on the other hand, the import penetration ratio rather increased in the 1890's. 46 For many goods tariffs were so high that they were effectually prohibitive. Hence, home producers seldom needed to utilise them fully in order to capture the home market. Given the data at hand it is, except for a few standardized commodities, not possible to compare domestic prices with world market prices on comparable goods. It is therefore generally not possible to gauge the degree to which tariffs were utilised. However, the monographs over individual industries, commissioned by the public investigation committee on the effects of the protectionist system, often gave tentative judgements. In the following I review some of these judgements.
43 Bairoch, European Trade Policy, 1815 -1914 This result is caused partly by a different sample than in the League of Nations study and partly because Liepmann in his calculation of ad valorem tariffs used f.o.b. prices from the main exporters as proxies for world prices in the denominator, while the League of Nations study used a simple average of import and export prices. 45 Capital goods producers that did not compete in the world market probably utilized the tariffs more or less fully. I have already mentioned that the paper tariff was not utilized for the most important export products, coarse paper, but for finer paper that had to compete with imports the very high tariff was probably utilized to 50 percent in 1913. 47 In the iron and steel industry tariffs were not utilized for export products, but for other products they probably were. 48 The same goes for iron and steel manufacturers. 49 In the consumer goods industries the degree of tariff utilization often varied depending on competitive conditions in the home market. After the raise of tariff protection for the shoe industry in the late 1890s, tariffs were probably fully utilised only in the first few years when the industry was established. Since the capital requirement for setting up a shoe factory was small, barriers to entry were consequently low and the home market was competitive. After domestic firms had captured the home market, tariff protection was no longer fully utilized. 50 In the rubber ware industry, that was established in the wake of the heightened tariff protection in the late 1890s, cartel agreements made it possible for Swedish firms to pocket the tariffs. 51 The tariff protection for the textile industry was 22 percent in 1914 (Appendix 1), which does not seem particularly high, but as already has been mentioned my estimate for the textile tariff rate is probably too low. In the coarse fabrics that Swedish firms specialized in, the tariffs were virtually prohibitive and in many cases not fully utilized. 52 Tacit or open collusion in the potteries and glass industry seems to have led in most cases to full utilization of the high tariffs. In the food processing industry the tariff protections was also prohibitive for many goods. World market prices often fluctuated to a substantial degree while domestic prices were more stable, so the degree of tariff utilization varied over time in industries such as the sugar industry and the flourmills. It was high when world market prices were low and lower when world market prices were high. 47 SOU 1924:38, p. 188 ; Bosaeus, Pappersindustriens produktionsförhållanden, p. 97. 48 SOU 1924 :38, p. 275. 49 SOU 1924 . 50 Smith, Den svenska skoindustrin, p. 81-82; SOU 1924:38, p. 172-173 . 51 Ohlin, Bertil, Den svenska kautschukindustriens utveckling 1890-1913 med särskild hänsyn till dess ställning åren närmast före världskriget. Stockholm: SOU 1922 :38, 1922 SOU 1924 :38, p. 249. 52 SOU 1924 . First he shows that the average rate of custom duty, i.e. total duties divided by total import value, increased only slightly or not at all for the major countries in continental Europe.
Concluding remarks
His second argument is that the import ratio, imports divided by GNP, did not fall. 56 The second argument is only persuasive if one can show that the composition of imports did not change. In the Swedish case the share of imports even increased, but its composition changed. Import penetration in the heavily protected consumer goods industries declined substantially, while imports of duty-free raw materials such as coal and cotton as well as capital and input goods such as pig iron, bulky steel products and machines increased. In fact, it should come as no surprise that a phase of import substitution at least temporarily leads to an increased import propensity. 57 This is illustrated by Swedish development in the 1890s. Home market industries were largely dependent on imported raw materials, machines and other capital goods and the general economic expansion in the 1890s also required more energy, which led to increased imports of coal.
The changing composition of imports also explains why Capies first argument is wide off the mark. The average tariff rate as measured by Capie declined in Sweden, simply because the composition of imports changed.
International comparisons of trade regimes are marred by the coexistence of incompatible estimates and of a lack of agreement on the proper way to measure tariff rates. Since late nineteenth century tariffs were specific in the overwhelming majority of cases, we must translate them into ad valorem tariff rates. This raises the traditional index number problem regarding which weights to use in order to calculate the average tariff rate.
In protection by the quotient total customs duties divided by total import value, presumably 58 See for example O'Rourke, Williamson, Globalization and history, p. 61. When discussing land prices these authors include Sweden along with Britain and Denmark in the "free-trading old world" in contrast to the "protectionist old world" countries Germany and France, although in chapter 6 of the same book they acknowledge that Sweden introduced tariffs on wheat, rye and barley at about the same level as France and Germany. 59 Liepmann, Tariff levels; League of Nations, Tariff level indices.
hoping that the bias is not too large, although it is generally acknowledged that such a measure gives a downward bias. 60 It is my contention that at least for the Swedish case the bias is substantial.
Even if one measures the tariff rate in a more appropriate way one may of course argue that the rate of protection was not 'high', however it was apparently high enough in the majority of cases to achieve its aim of deterring imports. It seems obvious that the protectionist system had effects, good or bad, on individual industries and thus also on Rye  0  25  21  40  37  30  32  34  Wheat  0  18  17  30  29  26  25  25  Barley  0  27  20  38  34  30  26  30  Oats  0  1 2  2  0  0  0  0  0  Grain tariffs, 1890 weights  0  18  12  21  19  17  16  17  Grain tariffs, 1913 weights  0  17  11  18  17  15  14  15  Pork  0  25  18  33  26  23  16  11  Meat  0  10  12  12  11  10  10  9  Tariffs, animal products  0  17  15  22  18  17  15  10  Tariffs, non competing agricultural products  42  17  14  21  27  27  19  21 Source: (SOU 1924 (SOU :38 1924 , appendix 1) BISOS F Iron and steelworks  13  14  14  15  14  12  12  12  12  12  12  11  10  10  27   Metal works  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  Iron, steel and metal manufacturing  10  10  10  11  12  10  10  12  12  12  11  12  13  13  20  Machine and engineering  industry  15  15  15  16  16  16  15  15  15  16  16  15  16  16  20   Electrical engineering  10  10  12  13  13  13  13  12  13  14  14  11  11  11 Remarks: The tariff rate in 1914 for the clothing industry has been calculated from information on prices and tariffs given in SOU 1924 in SOU :38, 1924 . For the boot and shoe industry the tariff rate for 1914 has been calculated on export prices.
